By Michael A. Cessna, Military Affairs Correspondent
Originally published March 14, 2025 for our Mid-Month Issue of Mindful Intelligence Advisor. Subscribe to get semi-monthly issues.
“If more of us valued food and cheer and song above hoarded gold, it would be a merrier world.” – J.R.R. Tolkien
INTRODUCTION
Something is stirring in Central Africa. A new power may be rising, one that could upset both world markets and world security, in a realm where Western governments cannot operate, for strategic, tactical, and “optical” reasons.
Upon Donald Trump’s ascension to power, he swiftly engaged in upending the rancid underbelly of the “Deep State.” Trump has become the now-hardened politician – a man openly looking for payback for the last four years of viciously deranged invective inflicted upon him and his family.
Yet even in that turmoil, another tempest churns, this one in Africa. The already-embattled President now faces a set of potential economic and foreign policy disasters left to fester by his predecessors.
In brief: Trump and the United States may be facing a mortal economic threat. How he weathers this minefield will almost certainly chart the course of the next few decades.
A. THE CURRENT SITUATION
Late last year, fighting suddenly surged in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s (DRC) North Kivu Province, as the M23 rebel group – displaying a previously unseen level of competence, equipment, and training – stormed into the remote province with a focused intensity not seen in the region in at least twenty years.
By the waning days of January, M23 rebels had smashed DRC forces in the area and captured the major city of Goma on the 25th. This also resulted in M23’s capture of nearly three hundred mercenaries, mostly from Romania – a capture of mercenaries on a scale not seen since the 1960s – who were eventually repatriated without too much trouble.
Also laid bare, was the open support of the M23 rebels by the nation of Rwanda. With Rwanda’s open support to M23, including deploying actual Rwandan Army troops on the ground in North Kivu, no one is taking Rwandan denials of direct involvement with any seriousness.
Since the genocide of the 1990s, Rwanda – led by its President, Paul Kagame – has remade itself into an economic power in the region, becoming one of the strongest economies in Central Africa, if not the entire continent. At the same time, Rwanda has rebuilt its military into a force to be both envied and feared.
Rwandan forces have taken the lead in the last ten years with the United Nation’s peacekeeping efforts throughout the world but especially in Africa, where it was Rwandan troops who helped to stabilize the Cabo Delgado insurgency in Mozambique.
Now, however, the tiger ostensibly built for peace seems rather to be devouring the steak that is the disorganized and perpetually impoverished region of the eastern Congo.
But they are not doing so alone.
B. CENTRAL AFRICA
Central Africa is defined as that region around the “Great Lakes” – comprised of Lakes Victoria, Tanganyika, Malawi, Turkana, Albert, Kivu, and Edward. It is one of the most mineral rich regions on Earth. Yet, it is also one the most grindingly poor regions, economically speaking.
For the most part, this is a consequence of both climate-driven diseases, a chaotic legacy of randomly drawn colonial borders, Africa’s terrible river systems, and the realpolitik of corporations and nations liberally spreading money and weapons to all takers in trade for the real gold of the modern world: rare earths.
It turns out “rare earth metals” are at the heart of the bloody history of the region. The mining combines of the mid- to late-twentieth century were concerned about minerals like iron, copper and uranium, in addition to the more mundane gold and diamonds.
With the rise of the high-tech computer industries that began in the 1980s, these operations refocused on crucial – and highly exotic – minerals like coltan, cobalt and lithium, among many others. From handheld smartphones to lithium-ion batteries, these exotic materials are the foundations of the modern world, at least in the West.
This mineral wealth, however, comes at a high cost.
The human rights abuses involved in how minerals are extracted in the Congo Basin are legendary. “Slavery” is simply too weak a word to describe the very-real situation on the ground. Rwanda (and more importantly, Uganda) has been happy to maintain that status quo, despite their public positions.
This brings us to the “silent partner” in the fighting: Uganda.
C. PROTO-RWANDA (UGANDA) REENTERS THE CHAT
Uganda’s journey from the devastation of Idi Amin’s rule to its current position as a regional power presents a compelling parallel to Rwanda’s more recent transformation, establishing a pattern that might be termed the “East African recovery model.”
- AFTER THE COLLAPSE – Following the overthrow of Amin in 1979 and the subsequent turbulent Milton Obote period, Uganda faced catastrophic economic collapse, with GDP having fallen by 40% and infrastructure in ruins. When Yoweri Museveni’s National Resistance Movement seized power in 1986, the country stood as a textbook failed state.
Museveni’s initial approach prioritized stability through a combination of military consolidation and pragmatic economic liberalization. By establishing firm control over the security apparatus, while simultaneously courting Western donors and international financial institutions, Uganda secured the breathing room needed for recovery.
- THE NEXT STAGE, THE DUAL TRACK APPROACH – The 1990s saw Uganda adopt structural adjustment programs that, while controversial, helped stabilize inflation and establish the foundations for growth, a situation that continues today.
This dual-track approach of internal security control paired with external economic engagement would later become a blueprint for Paul Kagame in post-genocide Rwanda.
Uganda’s economic recovery was remarkable in context. From 1992 to 2010, GDP growth averaged 7% annually, poverty rates declined from 56% to approximately 25%, and infrastructure – particularly in Kampala – saw significant improvements.
The government cultivated strong relationships with both Western donors and, increasingly, Chinese investors, playing potential partners against each other to maximize development assistance while minimizing political concessions.
This economic revival occurred alongside careful management of internal political dynamics. Museveni maintained power through a hybrid system that combined democratic formalities with authoritarian practices.
The government tolerated limited opposition, permitted a relatively free press, and held regular elections while ensuring none of these threatened central control. This approach of “managed democracy” created sufficient political stability for economic development while preventing the emergence of serious challengers to the regime – another model later adopted by Rwanda.
- BECOMING AN INFLUENCER – Uganda’s approach to regional security similarly presaged Rwanda’s later strategies. Museveni used both conventional military power and proxy forces to secure Uganda’s interests in neighboring countries, most notably in eastern DRC during the First and Second Congo Wars.
This now appears to be a pattern apparently repeating itself in the open in South Sudan as of the 11th of March. These interventions, while moderately justifiable on security grounds, also secured access to valuable mineral resources that supplemented the formal economy.
D. BECOMING KEIRETSU
- RWANDA EMERGES – The parallels between Rwanda’s subsequent development and Uganda’s are striking. Both countries emerged from catastrophic violence to achieve notable economic growth under strongman leadership. Both maintained tight internal security control while presenting a reform-oriented face to international donors.
Both developed sophisticated strategies for regional power projection that blended formal and informal mechanisms. And both cultivated international partners across ideological lines, pragmatically engaging with Western democracies, China, and regional organizations simultaneously.
Where the two models diverge is in scale and efficiency. Rwanda, under Kagame, has implemented a more disciplined and centralized version of the Ugandan model, achieving greater administrative effectiveness and lower corruption.
While Uganda pioneered the approach of combining authoritarian stability with economic liberalization, Rwanda has refined it into a more coherent system that has delivered more consistent results, particularly in public service delivery and economic planning.
- THE RARE EARTH ALLURE – As both countries now eye the mineral wealth of eastern DRC, Uganda stands as both predecessor and partner, backed up by “boots on the ground,” to Rwanda’s ambitions – a prototype that demonstrated the possibility of post-conflict transformation while establishing many of the regional dynamics that continue to shape East Africa’s security landscape.
- THE RAINBOW CRISIS – However, the foregoing is complicated by the LGBT+ question. Uganda has stated, pointedly and repeatedly, its hard-line stance against homosexuality. In this, Uganda pointedly rejected U.S.-led calls to repeal its hardcore stance against homosexuality, despite sanctions being imposed upon the country for its stance.
In this, lays the genesis of the current danger: Using Rwanda to take the lead, Ugandan leader Yoweri Museveni seems to be partnering with Paul Kagame to grind down on the West, by establishing a hard lock on controlling the Central African rare earths market.
In effect, Rwanda and Uganda are about to establish a kind of “sovereign keiretsu” in Africa’s Central Lakes region.
THE “PROMISING” FUTURE OF THE NEW KEIRETSU
- WHAT IS A KEIRETSU? – In the original Japanese, a “keiretsu” is a series of interlocking corporate relationships where the individual companies are usually unconnected – and not competing against each other – in the wider market.
While a keiretsu is typically corporate in nature, what is emerging in Central Africa is a keiretsu formed by sovereign states – not an open series of treaties, but an “understanding” between leaders on how to act in concert, for both strategic and business purposes.
- GHOST ALLIANCE – Rwanda and Uganda’s potential formation of a coordinated “ghost” economic-military alliance to dominate rare earth elements (REEs) in Central Africa represents a significant evolution in resource geopolitics with far-reaching implications. This emerging dynamic centers on the eastern region of the DRC, where Rwanda has already leveraged its support of its M23 rebel proxy group to secure influence over North Kivu’s vast mineral-rich territories.
The strategic calculus behind such a partnership lies in combining Rwanda’s established proxy networks and military effectiveness with Uganda’s greater economic infrastructure and international connections. Both nations possess experienced militaries with regional projection capabilities and histories of involvement in DRC’s resource extraction.
Their potential “keiretsu” arrangement would create a more formalized structure for resource extraction, processing, and export while maintaining plausible deniability regarding direct territorial control.
- M23 REBEL GROUP – The military proxy the alliance could use centers on the M23 rebel group, which reemerged in 2021 after nearly a decade of relative inactivity. Multiple UN reports have documented Rwandan direct support, including provision of advanced weapons, command elements, and territorial sanctuary.
M23’s operations have specifically focused on mineral-rich territories in North Kivu province, suggesting resource acquisition as a primary objective rather than broader political aims. Uganda’s military could provide complementary capabilities, particularly in logistics and broader territorial control.
- THE EASTERN DRC – The eastern DRC contains significant deposits of tantalum, cobalt, coltan, and other critical minerals essential for advanced technology manufacturing. While precise geological surveys remain incomplete due to ongoing instability, the region holds an estimated 70% of the world’s coltan and substantial reserves of other rare earths. These deposits have historically been exploited through artisanal mining without comprehensive geological mapping, suggesting their true value may exceed current estimates.
- THE RARE EARTH PRIZE – The economic implications extend far beyond Central Africa. The global rare earths market, currently dominated by China (which controls approximately 85% of processing capacity), has become increasingly strategic as nations seek supply chain security for critical technologies.
A Rwanda-Uganda alliance could position itself as an alternative supply source for Western markets eager to diversify away from Chinese dependence. However, unlike Australia or Canada’s developing rare earth sectors, this Central African supply would come with significant ethical complications.
For Rwanda’s President Kagame, this strategy represents a potential economic transformation for his landlocked nation. Rwanda’s economy, while showing impressive growth rates, lacks natural resources and remains vulnerable to international aid fluctuations.
Control over DRC’s mineral wealth would provide a sustainable revenue stream independent of Western donor priorities. Uganda’s President Museveni similarly faces economic pressure to develop new growth engines as his country struggles with debt and needs to capitalize on recent oil discoveries.
PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS
International reactions have been mixed, confused, and often contradictory. Western nations have issued diplomatic condemnations while continuing economic partnerships with both countries. China has maintained its own resource extraction agreements with DRC’s central government while pragmatically engaging with Rwanda.
The African Union and regional bodies like the East African Community have initiated peace processes that have yet to address the fundamental resource competition driving the conflict.
The broader geopolitical implications are potentially transformative for global technology supply chains. Western technology manufacturers, from defense contractors to consumer electronics companies, face increasing pressure to secure non-Chinese rare earth supplies while also adhering to conflicting mineral regulations.
A Rwanda-Uganda alliance could position itself as a “managed” source of these materials – more formalized than current conflict mineral networks but without the environmental and labor standards of Western producers.
For DRC and its citizens, the stakes are existential. The country has lost an estimated $4-8 billion annually to illicit resource extraction for decades, funds that could transform its development trajectory. The environmental consequences have been similarly severe, with unregulated mining causing widespread deforestation and water contamination.
This emerging resource competition represents the evolution of what some analysts have termed “hybrid resource colonialism” – utilizing proxy forces and economic pressure rather than direct occupation to secure vital materials.
As global demand for rare earths continues to grow with the expansion of renewable energy and advanced computing, the strategic value of controlling these resources will only increase, potentially cementing a new form of resource competition in one of Africa’s most volatile regions.
The question, however, is “Why?” These are highly aggressive moves for both countries to take. The answer is painfully simple.
Sub-Saharan Africa is fed up with the patronizing and moralizing attitude of Western countries – including the United States – who need their natural resources, but who insist on trying to moralize on how the African states’ attitudes need to conform to what the Western countries want…and when moralizing doesn’t work, resorting to bribery to rig elections.
While this sort of thing has worked in the past, the tables began to turn about ten years ago. Starting in the Sahel region, a series of coups d’états eventually led to the near-total withdrawal of France from its long-held spheres of colonial influence.
Yoweri Museveni – long a very keen observer of the West – smelled weakness, as did Paul Kagame…and what both men realized, was that this strategy could be adapted for their own use.
One of the glaring revelations exposed by the 2023 coup in Niger, was that Western states can no longer simply “invade” most Sub-Saharan countries. This is a result of not only strategic military weakness, but it also comes from the hard fact that no Western government can survive the image of mostly white military forces attacking Black African nations.
Certainly, Western states can send in “military assistance teams” to try and aid a nation’s military, and can usually send in small, temporary forces to rescue embassy staff when a nation “goes pear-shaped.”
But they cannot invade and conquer a Black nation, anymore, as the Western states’ own electorates absolutely will not tolerate such an action. This is the real calculus factor that both Museveni and Kagame understand. Their “unofficially official” alliance can grab certain swaths of terrain, take control of resource extraction in those areas – and Western states will have to comply.
In the case of rare earths, the West has no choice but to bend the knee: With Communist China directly supplying some 70% of the world’s supply of these minerals, and processing some 90% of global output – without which, most modern electronics technology cannot function – Western states absolutely need other sources…and the West’s old model of paternalistic attitudes to the non-Chinese regions of the world who supply rare earths have handed leaders like Museveni and Kagame all the moral justification they require.
Prices in tech are about to rise significantly, and there is very little that the new administration can do about it.
FURTHER RESOURCES
The Congo: From Leopold to Kabila: A People’s History – Georges Nzongola-Nataja
Rwanda: History and Hope – Margee M. Ensign and William E. Bertrand
Rwanda History: Learn About the Tragic Consequence of Rwanda – Alexander Fricks
The History of Uganda: From Ancient Legends to Modern Wonders – Angie Ngabo-Baker
