Originally published Nov 13, 2025 for our weekly Issue of Mindful Intelligence Advisor. Subscribe to get weekly issues.
By Michael A. Cessna, Military Affairs Correspondent
“Comrade Mao, whether he was crossing ‘a sea of surging waves’ or scaling ‘a mountain pass impregnable as iron’ always held unwaveringly to his course, setting a shining example for the Chinese Communist Party.” – Xi Jinping
INTRODUCTION
Communists love bureaucracy. The average Communist party makes the opaque and brain-melting “bureaucratese” coming from inside the Beltway read like a Dr. Seuss book. But, once said Party gets itself established, that tone rapidly hurls itself over a cliff…Case in point:
From October 20-23, 2025, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) convened its Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee – a gathering of roughly 370 top party officials that serves as one of the most important events in China’s political calendar.
For Western observers trying to understand where Beijing is heading, this plenum displayed a disturbing shift: Xi Jinping has consolidated more personal power than any Chinese leader since Mao Zedong, and he’s doing it through an unprecedented purge of the military and party elite…
And he also thinks that China can ‘go it alone’, angling for full-blown autarky for the Communist Chinese state. However, the confirmation of deep-cutting purges expose a shaky regime… one armed with an impressive nuclear arsenal.
A. BACKGROUND: THE HOLLOWED-OUT HALL
The most striking aspect of the Fourth Plenum wasn’t what happened – it was who didn’t show up. Only 168 of 205 Central Committee members attended, representing a mere 82% of the body. Another 24 alternate members were missing. Neil Thomas, a fellow at the Asia Society Policy Institute, dubbed it the “Purge Plenum,” describing it as the hollowest CCP gathering of the post-Mao era.
The absences weren’t due to illness or travel. They represented political death sentences – officials under investigation, expelled from the party, or simply vanished into China’s opaque disciplinary system.
A total attendance of 315 members marked the lowest number since Xi came to power in 2012, dramatically lower than the three-hundred and sixty-four who attended last year’s plenum, or the 373 from the year before.
But the real shock came from the military wing of the Party. Of forty-two People’s Liberation Army members on the Central Committee, fully 27 were absent – a staggering 63% absence rate, including twenty-two generals.
Among the missing: the respected and highly experienced Navy Commander, Vice Admiral Hu Zhongming, Commander of the Northern Theatre (charged with guarding the capital of Beijing) General Huang Ming, and Eastern Theatre Political Commissar Liu Qingsong.
These are not mid-level bureaucrats; these were the men responsible for commanding China’s military forces. This is eerily similar to the Stalinist purges of the 1930’s, even if they have not reached that scale… yet.
The more Xi purges what he views as potentially disloyal elements – both political and military – the more weakened and debilitated the Communist Chinese military becomes. For Western military observers, this muddies assessments of everything from the CCP’s nuclear arsenal (see below) to their ability to both invade Taiwan, and to contest the South China Sea with the United States. This is because military leadership becomes very unwilling to actually “train” their troops for anything but parades, if such training is viewed as a potential threat to their “Dear Leader“.
- THE PURGE SURGE – These purges, despite their small scale (compared to those of “Comrade” Stalin) are just as dramatic and damaging. Days before the plenum opened, Beijing announced the expulsion of nine senior military officers, including one of only two vice chairmen of the Central Military Commission – China’s highest military policymaking body – and a member of the ruling Politburo.
The expelled officers included Admiral Miao Hua, the PLA’s most senior ideologist, and his deputy, General He Hongjun, who reportedly “died by suicide” in the wake of “corruption” charges.
The plenum itself confirmed that ten Central Committee members and four of the alternates had been formally expelled – a near record for disciplinary actions. Since the 20th Party Congress in 2022, at least 14 generals have been purged, including former defense ministers Li Shangfu and Wei Fenghe.
But The scale becomes even more startling when examined closely: Of forty-four uniformed officers selected to the Central Committee in 2022, only some fifteen remain untouched as of late 2025 – A POLITICAL SURVIVAL RATE OF JUST 34%.
Lower-ranking alternate members fared only slightly worse, with a c.30% survival rate. The PLA’s Rocket Force, responsible for China’s nuclear deterrent and conventional missile forces, has seen its leadership cadres severely gutted, losing at least nine senior commanders, with one analyst noting that the force has been “almost completely purged of former senior leaders“.
Official explanations cite “corruption” – “serious violations of discipline” and “duty-related crimes involving an extremely large amount of money“. But while corruption is certainly endemic in China’s system, the timing and scale suggest something much more serious: Xi is systematically eliminating anyone who might pose even a theoretical challenge to his authority, even officers he personally promoted.
These sorts of actions are not, obviously, conducive to military efficiency or coherent policies and training.
- SELF-RELIANCE AS STRATEGY – Beyond the dramatic purges, the plenum advanced Xi’s economic agenda for the CCP’s 15th Five-Year Plan, covering the 2026-2030 timeframe. The full plan won’t be released until March 2026, but the official communiqué revealed Xi’s priorities: “self-reliance and self-strengthening in science and technology” to develop what Beijing calls “new quality productive forces,” marking a definitive shift towards autarky.
Translation: Xi wants China to become technologically independent of the West, particularly in advanced semiconductors, artificial intelligence, and military applications. The rhetoric of “self-strengthening” deliberately echoes China’s response to Western imperialism in the 19th century – a historical reference Xi’s audience understands implicitly. Whether they can pull this off or not is the real question – Short Answer: They almost certainly can’t.
Xi’s remarks to Trump at their meeting in South Korea – promising that “our two countries can totally help each other to succeed and prosper” – contrast sharply with his language while in Beijing, where he called for China to “win the strategic initiative amid fierce international competition“. One message soothes foreign audiences, the other reveals actual policy.
The plenum also reaffirmed China’s goal of reaching per capita GDP of $20,000 by 2035, which would require maintaining an annual growth above 4% for the next decade. Given China’s slowing economy, mounting debt, and demographic challenges (a festering leftover of the “One Child Policy” implemented in 1979), this is certainly ambitious, to the point of bordering on fantasy.
But Xi framed it as essential for China’s “great rejuvenation” – another loaded historical term suggesting a return to China’s perceived rightful place as the dominant power in Asia.
The problem with this rosy strategy is that in addition to the Communist state’s faltering domestic economy (see below), its flagship foreign trade scheme, the so-called “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI) is rapidly collapsing, increasing the velocity of Beijing’s economic death spiral.
B. WHAT THIS ALL MEANS
Three key conclusions have emerged from this plenum. First, Xi no longer faces meaningful internal opposition. The purges demonstrated his strength, not weakness. As one Asia Society analysis noted, by 2027 Xi will have promoted a new generation of officials “who have survived and internalized 15 years of his rule” – leaders steeped in an ethos of control and self-reliance rather than reform and experimentation.
Second, the military purges raise serious questions about PLA capabilities, readiness and internal cohesion. Xi has publicly ordered the military to be ready for action against Taiwan by 2027. Yet he’s simultaneously gutting the officer corps, creating an atmosphere where, as one Taiwanese analyst put it, “no one can be fully trusted“.
This suggests either that Xi believes loyalty matters more than competence, or that the corruption his internal security forces have uncovered genuinely threatens military effectiveness. Neither interpretation is reassuring, given how volatile the internal political maneuvering of the CCP can get.
Third, Xi’s emphasis on autarkic technological self-reliance and economic independence signals that he views strategic competition with the United States as inevitable and probably permanent. The conciliatory language for foreign consumption should not fool anyone – Beijing is preparing for a long-term competition it believes will determine whether the 21st century belongs to China or remains dominated by American power.
While these three conclusions are clear, they also mark a dangerously unstable mix of competing forces, over whose control it remains unclear how well Beijing can manage. In effect, Communist China is a technologically advanced, economically unstable, Third World tin-pot dictatorship…with a population of nearly 1.5 billion.
- THE POWER PARADOX – Xi Jinping now exercises “complete control” according to official rhetoric, with the party calling on officials to “unite more closely around the Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping at its core“. Yet the rows of empty seats at the plenum captured the paradox: absolute authority purchased through constant purges. It is the power of fear, not inspiration.
For Americans trying to understand China’s trajectory, the Fourth Plenum provides crucial insight. The United States faces a China led by one man who tolerates no dissent, who views the world solely through the lens of great-power competition, and who is willing to sacrifice experienced military leadership to ensure the personal loyalty of the remainder.
That makes China simultaneously more predictable – Xi’s word is policy – and more dangerous, since no institutional checks exist on his judgment…the dangers of which, the Biden Administration’s “autopen” controversy demonstrated.
This is very much the 21st Century version of the “Cult of Personality” and “Great Man” theories that defined the middle forty years of the 20th Century…with potentially everything bad that comes with them.
The question is not whether Xi controls China. He clearly does. The question is whether a system built on purges and fear can execute the sophisticated economic and military strategy Beijing envisions – or whether Xi’s iron grip is slowly strangling the very capabilities China needs to achieve his ambitions.
The greater question, however, is what might happen if Xi were to die suddenly, with no clear successor. When the Soviet Union fell at the end of 1991, in the wake of the Soviet hard liner’s reactionary coup attempt against Mikhail Gorbachev, there were certainly “issues“. But there was never any hint of an actual civil war among various Soviet factions.
In the Communist China of 2025-2026, there is no guarantee of a new civil war not happening. There are plenty of factions within the CCP – military, Party and industrial – that would be vying for power in the sudden aftermath of Xi’s downfall (from whatever method). None of the likely options are comforting.
- THE REALITY OF POWER – Old Is New…? – Communists always do Communist things, in very Communist ways – they are intellectually incapable of doing anything different. But, as always, History serves as both guide and warning.
While not reaching the scale of Stalin’s purges – yet – Xi’s methodology of enforcing discipline through capricious iron rule reveals a highly disturbing trend in the internal politics of a nuclear-armed state.
Communist China’s economy is slowing dramatically, despite observers desperately trying to put lipstick on a pig. This alone is a serious problem, given the Communist giant’s sheer population density.
But really, the series of dangerously disruptive purges are the true problem.
- WHERE THE PURGES LEAD: THREE DANGEROUS SCENARIOS – The immediate question facing Western strategists is deceptively simple: does Xi’s consolidation of power make China more or less dangerous?
The uncomfortable answer is that it makes Beijing simultaneously weaker and more unpredictable – a combination that historically produces catastrophic miscalculations.
3.1: THE 2027 PROBLEM: A GUTTED MILITARY MEETS AN AMBITIOUS TIMELINE – Xi Jinping has publicly committed the People’s Liberation Army to being ready for military action against Taiwan by 2027.
Yet he’s simultaneously purged two-thirds of the PLA’s senior leadership since 2022. The contradiction is stark: Communist China wants to prepare for perhaps the most complex and dangerous military operation since D-Day – an amphibious assault across the Taiwan Strait – with an officer corps that has been decimated not by enemy action but by its own leaders’ paranoia.
The parallel to Stalin’s “Winter War” against Finland is stark.
History offers that war as a grim precedent for today. Stalin’s purges of the Soviet military in the late 1930s removed – often lethally – experienced commanders and replaced them with politically reliable mediocrities and outright incompetents.
When Hitler invaded the Soviet Union in 1941, the Red Army’s initial performance was catastrophically bad, with millions of casualties and staggering swaths of territory lost in the first months. The Soviet Union eventually prevailed through sheer industrial capacity and population density – advantages that won’t help China in a “Taiwan invasion” scenario requiring precision, absolute timing, intimate coordination, and split-second decision-making.
The danger isn’t that Xi’s weakened military will be too cautious. It’s that a command structure built on fear will tell Xi only what he wants to hear, rather than what he needs to know. When every officer knows that honest assessments can end careers (or lives), intelligence gets filtered through layers of self-preservation. Plans become overly optimistic. Risks get minimized. And leaders eventually make decisions based on fantasy rather than reality.
3.2: THE ECONOMIC TRAP: WHEN PROMISES MEET REALITY – Xi’s commitment to 4% annual growth through 2035 faces structural headwinds that no amount of political will can overcome. China’s working-age population is shrinking by roughly 5 million people per year. Local government debt exceeds 60 trillion yuan (approximately US$8.4 trillion).
The property sector – which drove Mainland Chinese growth for two decades – has collapsed. And Xi’s emphasis on “self-reliance” means cutting China off from the very technological exchange that fueled its previous rise…that also undermines his vaunted “Belt and Road Initiative“.
When authoritarian regimes face this combination of slowing growth and disappointed expectations, they historically reach for the nationalist playbook. A Taiwan adventure offers Xi a way to rally domestic support, distract from economic failure, and fulfill his “great rejuvenation” promises (rather like Leopoldo Galtieri in 1982) – all while the window of American distraction or weakness might be open.
The calculation then becomes perverse: Xi might choose military action – not from a position of strength but from weakness. He might be thinking that waiting only makes his economic and demographic problems worse. This is the most dangerous scenario: not a confident China executing a long-planned strategy, but a desperate China gambling that external aggression can solve internal problems.
3.3: THE SUCCESSION BLACK HOLE – Xi is 72 years old and has methodically eliminated anyone who could plausibly succeed him. The Central Committee members who survive his purges are survivors precisely because they pose no threat – which means they possess no independent power base, no vision beyond Xi’s, and no legitimacy separate from their association with him. When Xi eventually dies or becomes incapacitated, China faces a succession crisis with no obvious resolution.
This matters because it affects Xi’s timeline for major action. If he believes his window for achieving his goals – particularly regarding Taiwan – is limited to his own lifespan, that creates pressure on him for action sooner rather than later. A leader who has made himself indispensable will want to secure his legacy while he can still direct events.
This fear – the unseating of a dictator who has no clear successor – was one of the exact considerations that went into not outright invading and conquering Iraq in 1991, as Saddam Hussein – as in 2003 – had no obvious successor, and none of the Coalition powers of that time wanted to get bogged down in an occupation of a nation of over 17 million people.
And China has a population well in excess of one billion, and closer to 1.4 or 1.5 billion.
PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS
What Should America Do? – These scenarios argue for a specific American policy response: strengthen deterrence now, while Xi’s military is still weakened by purges, but before desperation drives recklessness. This means accelerating arms sales to Taiwan, making explicit defense commitments that remove ambiguity, and working with allies to demonstrate that the costs of aggression would be prohibitive regardless of China’s internal political needs.
On the economic front, this also means that the United States needs to accelerate and expand its domestic manufacturing of general-use microprocessors, as far too much of America’s need for these is anchored in Taiwan, and is thus exposed to catastrophic disruption in the event of a Communist invasion attempt, successful or not.
The worst wrinkle here is the terrible situation with the United States military’s manning levels. After being gutted by mismanaged budgets, insane procurement strategies, and having its traditional recruiting demographics be actively discouraged (by whatever means) from enlisting, the United States military remains smaller than it was in 1941.
While there has been a “bump” to recruiting numbers in the aftermath of Donald Trump’s 2024 election, it remains to be seen if that boost can be sustained, because technology will not overcome the numbers problem, here, as Communist China is too close to the U.S., technologically speaking.
The worst mistake for the U.S. government would be to interpret Xi’s consolidation of power as evidence of Chinese strength and confidence. Dictators who rule through fear are often at their most dangerous when they are at their weakest, because they have the most to prove – to their own populations, to their purged rivals, and to themselves.
Xi Jinping has built a system where no one can challenge him. That means no one can stop him either. And a China that cannot restrain its leader is a China that Americans must prepare to deter, contain, and if necessary, defeat.
The Fourth Plenum didn’t reveal a confident superpower ready to peacefully surpass America. It revealed a nuclear-armed dictatorship trapped by its own internal logic, led by a man who has eliminated every check on his judgment, facing economic and demographic decline that he cannot admit and cannot reverse.
That is not a recipe for caution. It’s a recipe for catastrophe.
FURTHER RESOURCES:
The Opium Wars: A History from Beginning to End – Hourly History
The Soviet Invasion of Finland, 1939-40 – Carl Van Dyke
The Struggle for Taiwan: A History of America, China, and the Island Caught Between – Sulman Khan
